The BRRD vs. Normal Insolvency Proceedings. Opposite or interconnected? The scope of the new EU resolution framework. by Zambas, Michalis
  
The BRRD vs. Normal 
Insolvency Proceedings. 
Opposite or Interconnected? 
The scope of the new EU 
resolution framework.  
 
MICHALIS ZAMBAS 
 
SCHOOL OF ECONOMICS, BUSINESS ADMINISTRATION & LEGAL STUDIES 
A thesis submitted for the degree of  
Master of Laws (LLM) in Transnational and European Commercial Law, 
Banking Law, Arbitration/Mediation 
 
 
 
 
January 2020 
Thessaloniki – Greece 
 
ii 
 
 
 
 
 
Student Name:  Michalis Zambas 
SID:  1104180027 
Supervisor: Dr T.R.M.P Keijser (Thomas) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
I hereby declare that the work submitted is mine and that where I have made use of 
another’s work, I have attributed the source(s) according to the Regulations set in the 
Student’s Handbook. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
January 2020 
Thessaloniki - Greece 
iii 
Abstract 
This dissertation was written as part of the Master of laws (LLM) in Transnational and 
European Commercial Law, Banking Law, Arbitration/Mediation at the International 
Hellenic University.  
Having regard the dramatic outcomes of the recent global financial crisis that proves 
normal insolvency proceedings to be inadequate to handle financial institutions 
collapse, the present thesis aspires to offer as comprehensive as possible within the 
limits of dissertation an analysis of the new EU resolution framework in comparison 
with normal insolvency proceedings and, in particular, with liquidation procedure. The 
Bank Recovery and Resolution Directive (BRRD) constitute the core of the research and 
mainly, its resolution toolkit that applied in a situation of financial distress in cases 
when the institution’s collapse cannot be obviated in any other way.  
Accordingly, this thesis focused on what are the new steps and rules that European 
legislators brought in the aftermath of the financial crisis and how much further did 
they go in comparison with normal insolvency proceedings. Moreover, aims to present 
whether the new resolution framework under the BRRD offers something more than 
the normal insolvency proceedings in relation to its methods and goals, whenever 
banks turns to be insolvent. In addition, it evaluate if there are any differences 
between bank resolution under the BRRD and liquidation of banks under normal 
insolvency proceedings.  
Resolution and liquidation cases that occurred after the BRRD enforcement are 
presented by this thesis in order to illustrate the above matters and, to reflect any 
weaknesses of the new bank resolution directive. To end with, it will present some 
reviews by several professors and what should have be done to establish a trend that 
could be followed by each Member State despite the peculiarities that may have to 
deal with.  
 
Keywords: BRRD, normal insolvency proceedings, bank liquidation, banks resolution, 
resolution tools, bail-in tool, Too Big to fail problem 
 
Michalis Zambas 
January 28th 2020
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Preface 
The purpose of this thesis is to present and demonstrate the process that has been 
made since the global financial crisis with the EU new resolution framework for banks 
and, financial institutions in comparison with the normal insolvency proceedings and in 
particular, with the liquidation process for failing banks. Intrigued by my real interest 
into the successive changes that had been established in European Union in the 
aftermath of financial crisis of 2007-2008 in order to handle effectively and properly 
the constant challenges and difficulties that were presented by the banking system 
worldwide, I decided to undertake a legal research scrutinizing the recovery and 
resolution directive for banks and financial institutions adopted in 2014 to end the 
significant problems that till then, cost big banks to collapse around the globe.  
I was engaged in researching and writing this thesis from October to January 2020. The 
research was difficult, but conducting broad examination has permitted me to answer 
the identified questions. However, this could not have been achieved without the 
catalytic contribution and support of a group of people.  
First and foremost, I would like to express my sincere gratitude and thanks to my 
supervisor, Dr T.R.M.P Keijser (Thomas) for his insightful observations and useful 
suggestions as well as, his valuable guidance in accomplishing and introducing a 
satisfying and structured result.  
Moreover, I would like to convey my appreciation to the professors at the 
International Hellenic University, for the essential knowledge that I have been 
obtained during the academic year.   
Last but not least, I could not help but express my deeply thanks and gratitude to my 
family, specially my parents for their continuous support and encouragement. 
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Introduction 
The last couple of years had been significantly difficult for the global economy. The 
financial crisis of 2007-2008, also referred to as the global financial crisis, was a drastic 
worldwide economic crisis and considered to be by several economists one of the 
most serious financial crises that affected the globe. The whole economic system came 
across significant challenges to the point that enormous changes ensued to the 
structure of the banking sector and, new regulatory frameworks and directives 
appeared into the scene. 
Historically, the financial crisis started in 2007 by a crisis in the subprime mortgage 
market in the United States and by the intensely dramatic collapse of the investment 
bank Lehman Brothers on September 15, 2008; it was then developed into an 
international banking crisis. Since the end of 2009, the European debt crisis, also 
known as the eurozone crisis or, the European sovereign debt crisis, had been taking 
place in the European Union. Numerous Member States, for instance, Ireland, Spain, 
Greece, Cyprus, Portugal appeared to be unable to pay their government debt or, to 
bail out over-indebted banks under their national supervision without the aid of third 
parties such as, the European Central Bank (ECB), the International Monetary Fund 
(IMF) or, other eurozone countries. Indisputably, the downfall of American investment 
bank Lehman Brothers, like a chain, caused an economic decline, which Europe felt 
extremely hard and intense.  
Since the economic downturn in Europe, many politicians and legislators throughout 
Europe in the aftermath of the downfall have tried to ensure that such a frightening 
collapse could never happen again. The dramatic fall of Lehman Brothers illustrated 
that the insolvency of a huge or, linked financial institution can have as an outcome a 
full downturn of the whole industry. Due to the lack of appropriate tools for the 
resolution of banks at the time, the need to turn to public funds to sustain financial 
stability was inevitable. The financial crisis proved normal insolvency to be ineffective. 
Precisely, normal insolvency proceedings proved to be unsuitable to deal efficiently 
with the failure of financial institutions. Thus, specific rules for bank resolution were 
needed and taxpayers should not be liable to bail out financial institutions anymore. 
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European legislators focused on improving the situation by taking effective measures 
and creating a framework of tools that enables the proper resolution of banks without 
the use of public funds and jeopardizing financial stability, which is vital for proper 
functioning of market economy. 
This new instrument, provided by the application of the Directive 2014/59/EU (BRRD) 
of the European Parliament and the council, which established a new framework for 
the recovery and resolution of credit institutions and firms. With the above, the 
primary objective of the Recovery and Resolution plan is to preserve financial stability 
and to reduce losses for society without the need to rely on taxpayers’ assistance. 
Virtually, the BRRD constitute a core element of European endeavors to end the too 
big to fail problem. European bank cases that occurred after its establishment 
demonstrate several issues and confusion, in particular, the resolution of Spain’s 
Banco Popular vs. the liquidation of the Italian’s Veneto Banca and Banca Popolare di 
Vicenza.  
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Chapter I: The rationale behind the BRRD and its legal framework. 
 
The beginning in order to present a summary of the BRRD background it has to be the 
beginning of the crisis in 2007, with the sharp increase of money market interest rates 
and the rise of spreads. 
 
1. Historical background: The trail towards the implementation of the EU Bank 
Recovery and Resolution Directive.1 
 
In 2008, Lehman Brothers a family-owned private partnership enduring more than one 
hundred years and turned to be the fourth-investment banking company in the US had 
a dramatic collapse. Their decision to invest in subprime mortgages and derivatives 
proved to be disastrous as losses on these instruments contributed to the firm’s filing 
for bankruptcy.2 Consequently, Lehman Brothers’ failure cost a great recession; the 
Federal Reserve Bank of New York borrowed billions of dollars for the rescue of the 
worldwide insurance company American International Group (AIG).3 The Government 
concludes that AIG was too big to fail as it was linked with other various huge banks 
and financial institutions and the systemic risk was extremely feasible. Accordingly, 
without the bailout, AIG’s downfall could have cost severe damages to the financial 
system.4 Immediately after the report for Lehman Brothers hit the market results 
                                               
1 See: Anastasia Gromova-Schneider, ‘Understanding Bank Recovery and Resolution in the EU: 
A Guidebook to the BRRD’, [April,2017], World Bank Group Finance&Markets Financial Sector 
Advisory Center (FinSAC),  p.17, available at: 
<http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/100781485375368909/Understanding-bank-
recovery-and-resolution-in-the-EU-a-guidebook-to-the-BRRD>, accessed 11 Oct 2019 
2 Harvard Business School Baker Library, ‘Lehman Brothers Collection’ (Introduction), available 
at: <https://www.library.hbs.edu/hc/lehman/Exhibition/Introduction>, accessed 11 Oct 2019 
3 Ibid, (Global Impact of the Collapse), available at: 
<https://www.library.hbs.edu/hc/lehman/Exhibition/Global-Impact-of-the-Collapse> accessed 
11 Oct 2019 
4 Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission, ‘The Financial Crisis Inquiry Report’, [January 2011], 
Official Government Edition, p.352, available at 
https://books.google.com.cy/books?id=QIKfTVrhNfMC&printsec=frontcover&dq=the+financial
+crisis+inquiry+report&hl=el&sa=X&ved=0ahUKEwiHnNnRiq3nAhXJpIsKHSTqCrYQ6AEINDAB#v
=onepage&q=the%20financial%20crisis%20inquiry%20report&f=false, accessed 11 Oct 2019 
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illustrated into another big company, Fannie Mae dipped 16 percent. New York turned 
truly upsetting that Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, two of the world’s biggest 
companies could be at risk. Practically, every Wall Street’s bank work with them and 
mortgage market motility rely on them. As tremendous consequences hit, government 
officials discussed a conservatorship rescued plan and some even suggested more 
drastic measures i.e. bailout.5 Additionally the same year, two of the UK’s biggest 
banks, the Bear Stearns Companies along with the Northern Rock, failed as part of the 
global financial crisis. In 2008 Iceland also came into crisis after the downfall of the 
country’s banking system that considered being more aggressive than the failure on 
Wall Street in 1929-32, the debt was excessive and there was a multifaceted crisis as it 
touched various aspects such as political, society and currency.6 As an outcome, G20 
leaders acknowledged the fact that the global financial crisis seriousness brought high 
demands that were ahead of the capabilities of the Federal Stability Forum (FSF). 
Major coordination on financial coordination and systematic cooperation among 
countries was unavoidable hence; the Financial Stability Board (FSB) was created, and 
with that G20 provides a new regulatory organization with international scope for an 
extensive improvement of financial regulation and supervision. Additionally, one of 
FSB’s head functions is researching financial shortcomings. Virtually, the establishment 
of FSB genuinely helped for a confident recovery in the banking system and constitutes 
a step forward to improvement.7  
Moreover in 2010, in the US the enactment of the Dodd-Frank Act took place, which its 
main goal was to avert extra bailouts of the financial system at taxpayers’ detriment as 
                                               
5 Charles Duhigg ‘Loan-Agency Woes Swell From a Trickle to a Torrent’ [July 11, 2008], The 
NewYorkTimes, available at: 
<https://www.nytimes.com/2008/07/11/business/11ripple.html?ex=1373515200&en=8ad220
403fcfdf6e&ei=5124&partner=permalink&exprod=permalink> accessed 11 Oct 2019 
6 Stefan Olafsson ‘Iceland’s Financial Crisis and Level of Living Consequences’, Working Paper 
np3:2011,[2011], p.4, available at: 
<https://thjodmalastofnun.hi.is/sites/thjodmalastofnun.hi.is/files/skrar/icelands_financial_cris
is_and_level_of_living.pdf >, accessed 12 Oct 2019 
7 Randal K. Quarles ‘The Financial Stability at 10 Years-Looking Back and Looking Ahead’, 
Speech  [Oct 3, 2019], Board of Governors of Federal Reserve System, available at: 
<https://thjodmalastofnun.hi.is/sites/thjodmalastofnun.hi.is/files/skrar/icelands_financial_cris
is_and_level_of_living.pdf>, accessed 12 Oct 2019 
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well as to tackle the matters of systemic risk in the financial system.8 Furthermore, 
that same year, the Greek national crisis initiated and crisis overflowed into growing 
markets. Economic crisis in Cyprus result a couple of years later, in 2013 and a form of 
bail-in was applied before the establishment of the BRRD.9 Since 2010 the European 
Commission has promoted almost 30 sets of rules to prevent risk for the financial 
sector and secure products, markets, and financial actors. The pre-crisis framework 
seemed incapable of dealing with a financial crisis, for instance, there were no 
instruments to respond with the failure of huge cross-border banks. Thus, with a 
powerful financial framework for the single market, improved regulated and 
supervised banks would become stronger and more effective for the real economy 
taxpayers would be secured by not having to pay the bill of banks’ errors and financial 
stability would be supported. Furthermore, behind the idea that ‘without good 
supervision, regulation can be worthless’,10 financial sector supervision renewed and 
three European supervisory authorities (ESAs) were introduced in 2011 for a 
supervisory architecture, the European Bank Authority (EBA), the European Securities 
and Markets Authority (ESMA) and the European Insurance and Occupational Pensions 
Authority (EIOPA). Also, a European Systemic Risk Board (ESRB) was created to oversee 
and examine possible risks of financial stability. The European Council made a 
recommendation for a single rulebook to be applied for all the financial institutions 
into the single market since 2009, although the core of the single rulebook, which 
                                               
8 Michael Schillig, ‘Resolution and Insolvency of Banks and Financial Institutions’, [First 
published 2016] Oxford University Press, p.30 (par.2.28) 
9 The Cyprus sovereign debt and banking crisis demonstrated several insufficiencies such as the 
problem of splitting public debt matters from bank resolution. At first, creditors were to be 
bailed-in regardless of their insolvency priority through a special levy and a protection for 
major unsecured bondholders was foreseen. However, at the end creditors were bailed in 
based on their insolvency ranking and higher unsecured creditors having deposits over 
€100.000 were bailed in,  while guarantee deposits were not bailed in. It appears that Cyprus’s 
Domestic Guarantee Scheme (DGS) was not summoned to redress depositors up to €100.000. 
The Bank of Cyprus recapitalization was succeeded and Laiki Bank was winding down with the 
transfer of the guarantee deposits into Cyprus of Bank. Cyprus’ DGS showed to have poor 
resources in spite of the protection of guaranteed depositors and above all Cyprus crisis 
discloses that a completed legal framework and an emergency scheme were highly required.  
See: ‘The Cypriot Crisis Revisited’, [Sep 2013], available at HeinOnline, p.48 
10 European Commission, ‘A Comprehensive EU response to the financial crisis: substantial 
progress towards a strong financial framework for Europe and a banking union for the 
eurozone’, [28 Mar 2014], MEMO, Brussels, available at: < https://europa.eu/rapid/press-
release_MEMO-14-244_en.htm >, accessed 13 Oct 2019 
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enclosed a tighter pack of rules for banks known as Capital Requirements Directive IV 
(CRD IV) through a Directive and a Regulation11-also referred as Basel III agreement- 
became activated on 16 July 2013. Still, even a stronger financial sector was not 
enough to deal with the complex relationship among banks and sovereign debt. Hence, 
the necessity for a better managed and profound economic and monetary union 
(EMU) for countries that share the same currency became essential to make it work in 
the long term. For that reason, EU Heads of State and Government agreed to develop 
a Banking Union in 2012, completing the EMU that was established particularly for the 
eurozone countries but it was also open for non-euro EU member states who may 
want to participate.12  
Continue with, the BRRD13entered into force on 2 July 201414 and required to be 
applied in national legislation by 1 January 2015. In particular, the time limit for the 
                                               
11 Regulation (EU) No 575/2013 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 June 2013 
on prudential requirements for credit institutions and investment firms and amending 
Regulation (EU) No 648/2012 (OJ L 176, 27.6.2013, p. 1), Directive 2013/36/EU of the European 
Parliament and of the Council of 26 June 2013 on access to the activity of credit institutions 
and the prudential supervision of credit institutions and investment firms, amending Directive 
2002/87/EC and repealing Directives 2006/48/EC and 2006/49/EC (OJ L 176, 27.6.2013, p. 
338–436). 
12 European Commission, ‘A Comprehensive EU response to the financial crisis: substantial 
progress towards a strong financial framework for Europe and a banking union for the 
eurozone’, [2014], MEMO, Brussels, available at: < https://europa.eu/rapid/press-
release_MEMO-14-244_en.htm >, accessed 13 Oct 2019. The Single Rulebook includes all the 
rules that all EU financial institutions need to follow and on which Banking Union relies. One 
part of the single rulebook is BRRD for resolution, the other one is CRD/CRR for supervision 
and there are also new rules for Deposit Guarantee Scheme (DGS) that altogether constitute a 
single regulatory frame. Furthermore, the Banking Union has tools for micro and macro-
prudential supervision, bank resolution and crisis administration through its Supervision and 
Resolution powers. Particularly, the Banking Union encompasses three parts, the Single 
Supervisory Mechanism (SSM), the Single Resolution Mechanism (SRM) and, a European 
Deposit Insurance Scheme (EDIS) that is still in the making process.  See: Pamela Lintner, Lira 
Qefalia, ’Understanding Bank Recovery and Resolution in the EU: A Guidebook to the BRRD’, 
[April 2017], World Bank Group Finance & Markets (FinSAC),  p.24-25 
13 Directive 2014/59/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 15 May 2014 
establishing a framework for the recovery and resolution of credit institutions and investment 
firms and amending Council Directive 82/891/EEC, and Directives 2001/24/EC, 2002/47/EC, 
2004/25/EC, 2005/56/EC, 2007/36/EC, 2011/35/EU, 2012/30/EU and 2013/36/EU, and 
Regulations (EU) No 1093/2010 and (EU) No 648/2012, of the European Parliament and of the 
Council, OJ L 173, 12.6.2014, p. 190 
14 European Commission, ‘Law Details, Information about the Directive 2014/59/EU on bank 
recovery and resolution including date of entry into force and links to summary and 
consolidated version’, available at: <https://ec.europa.eu/info/law/bank-recovery-and-
resolution-directive-2014-59-eu/law-details_en>, accessed 13 Oct 2019 
   
  -7- 
implementation for the substantially of all of its provisions into the legislation, 
regulations and administrative rules of Member States was settled to be by 31 
December 2014 to 1 January 2015.15 Along with the Single Resolution Mechanism 
(SRM)16, a new multifaceted dualistic plan for the resolution and insolvency of banks 
and financial institutions has been established in the EU.17 Moreover, on 1 January 
2016, it became requisite according to the BRRD to bail in lenders and stockholders for 
a number of 8% of full liabilities before any capital injection in a bank under 
resolution.18 
 
 
1.1 The too big to fail problem. 
 
 
 
Taking into account the aforementioned, the global financial crisis-generally appeared 
as the lowest ever since the Great depression-19 has revealed great deficiencies in 
regards to financial systems, and the reasons were numerous and tricky. Nonetheless, 
one of the major issues that seem to be the link among all the factors was the threat 
towards financial stability that was caused by the banks that were too big, 
interconnected and complex to be closed or fail. This is commonly known as the ‘too 
big to fail’20 problem, a phrase that has to do with some issues which are partly related 
                                               
15 Pierre de Gioia Carabelesse, Daoning Zhang, ‘The legal nature of the recovering and 
resolution plans’, [2019] I.C.C.L.R (30)7, 380-398, available at: uk.westlaw.com, p.1, 12 
16 Regulation (EU) No 806/2014 of the European Parliament and the Council establishing 
uniform rules and a uniform procedure for the resolution of credit institutions and certain 
investment firms in the framework of a Single Resolution Mechanism and, a Single Resolution 
Fund and amending Regulation (EU) No 1093/2010 of the European Parliament and the 
Council, OJ EU L 225/1 30.7.2017 (SRM Regulation). 
17 Michael Schillig, ‘Resolution and Insolvency of Banks and Financial Institutions’, [2016] 
Oxford, p. 1  
18 Benoit Mesnard, ‘“Bail ins” in recent banking resolution and State aid cases’, [July 2016], 
European Parliament, PE 574.395, p.1, available at: 
<http://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/IDAN/2016/574395/IPOL_IDA(2016)57439
5_EN.pdf>, accessed 13 Oct 2019 
19 Arthur E. Wilmarth Jr.,‘Reforming Financial Regulation to Address the Too-Big-to-Fail 
problem’, [2010], available at: HeinOnline, p. 707 
20 The TBTF proved to be a massive problem as it produced unreasonable risk-taking and 
decrease market discipline. Governor Mervyn King of the Bank of England argued that the over 
the top aid to banks over the globe has created the greatest moral hazard in history and 
highlighted that those banks took those damaging risks because of the safety they felt as, the 
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to the size of an institution’s balance sheet.21 The aftermath of the bailout of banks 
was the need for a transformative regulation to diminish the odds and the effect of a 
collapse. In the purpose of maximizing banks’ resiliency, the improvement of 
resolution regimes along with higher liquidity and capital requirements was an 
essential element. Accordingly, a new harmonized international standard for 
resolution regimes for financial institutions provided by the Financial Stability Board’s 
Key Attributes of Effective Resolution Regimes for Financial Institutions (KA), approved 
by the G20 in October 2011.22 Although, KA mainly pays attention to global 
systemically important banks (G-SIBs) it was also utilized as a direction for jurisdictions 
that are altering or endorsing domestic resolution regimes. About that, the EU was a 
precursor in the implementation of KA, specifically regards to bail-in tool.23 Concerning 
the above, the EU Commission’s in 2010 define an extensive plan for a legal frame, 
which let governments to handle effectively the infirm credit institutions. Therefore, 
comprises apart from the BRRD, the need for additional harmonization of bank 
insolvency regimes seeking for liquidating and resolving them in the same core 
standards something that mainly has to do with the ranking of creditors in national law 
that might have a thoughtful impact on the application of the bail-in tool. 
Furthermore, a comprehensive resolution regime based on a single European 
                                                                                                                                         
government, in any case, would support them in a possible failure. See: Ibid p.742. Also, the 
TBTF label seems to perfectly pinpoint the dysfunctional character of the financial system i.e. 
the government’s repeated scheme to bail out huge financial institutions. See: Saule T. 
Omarova, ‘The Too Big to Fail problem’, [2019], available at: HeinOnline,  p. 2495 
21 Michael Schillig, ‘Resolution and Insolvency of Banks and Financial Institutions’, [2016], 
OXFORD, p.2 
22 Virtually, with the KA, FSB set out twelve main features for an effective resolution regime,  
allowing the governments to neatly resolve financial institutions without taxpayers disclosure 
to losses from solvency assistance, while sustain continuousness of their essential economic 
acts. On 15 October 2014 FSB added further guidance records that clarify particular KAs that 
have to do with info sharing for resolution intentions and, how they must be applied to 
insurers and financial market infrastructures (FMIs). These guidance documents have been 
included as annexes into the 2014 version without any changes to the 2011 text. See: Financial 
Stability Board, ‘Key Attributes of Effective Resolution Regimes for Financial Institutions’, [15 
Oct 2014], p.1-2 
23 World Bank Group Finance & Markets FinSAC, ‘Understanding Bank Recovery and Resolution 
in the EU: A Guidebook to the BRRD’, [2017], p.5 (Introduction) 
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Resolution Authority considered being a part of the completion of the Banking Union 
for the eurozone states.24 
 
 
2. Resolution under the BRRD: content, scope, objective, powers and tools. 
 
2.1 The EU multi-tier resolution regime: the BRRD and SRM, as well State aid as an 
alternative option under the BRRD. 
 
 
Even with sturdy supervision and the utilized of early intervention instruments banks 
cannot fully avoid the possibility of a collapse. Hence, the SRM as the second pillar of 
the Banking Union managed bank resolution efficiently, seeking to reduce taxpayer’s 
costs and decrease any harmful results to the real economy in Europe.25 Consequently, 
the EU multi-tier resolution regime includes of the BRRD, which is broadly applicable to 
the EU Member States and to the European Economic Area, something that is 
noticeable according to its scope, as it applies also to the non-eurozone MSs, for 
instance to Sweden and UK;26 and the SRM that operates, along with the SSM27 only to 
specific group firms and also banks, which are developed into the eurozone states. 
While the BRRD needs incorporation into domestic legislation by every Member State, 
the SRM regulation has a direct effect and collects specific resolution tasks as well as 
rulings for the Banking Union28. The SRM is based on the ground rules set out in the 
BRRD and in the domestic implementing terms.29 In other words, the SRM appears to 
                                               
24 M Schillig, ‘Resolution and Insolvency of Banks and Financial Institutions’ [2016], Oxford, p.5 
(para.1.08) 
25 Pamela Lintner, Lira Qefalia, ‘Understanding Bank Recovery and Resolution in the EU: A 
Guidebook to the BRRD’, [2017], World Bank Group Finance & Markets FinSAC,  p.26 
26 Pierre de Gioia Carabellese, Daoning Zhang, ‘The legal nature of the recovery and resolutions 
plans’, [2019], I.C.C.L.R (30)7 380-398, available at: uk.westlaw.com, p. 2 
27 Ibid  
28 European Commission, ‘Report from the Commission to the European Parliament and 
council on the application and review of Directive 2014/59/EU (Bank Recovery and Resolution 
Directive) and Regulation 806/2014 (Single Resolution Mechanism Regulation)’, [30.4.2019] 
COM(2019), 213 final Brussels, p.1 
29 Michael Schillig, ‘Resolution and Insolvency of Banks and Financial Institutions.’, [2016] 
Oxford, p.98 (para. 4.51) 
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adopt the recovery and resolution scheme of the BRRD30 and has a complementary 
role instead of acting as a substitution or as a replacement.31 
Moreover, while the BRRD seeks a minimum harmonization measure, the SRM 
considers being a maximum harmonization tool.32 Following the requirement of a 
powerful resolution system after the financial crisis, full-scale harmonization could be 
predicted. Nonetheless, also with the responsibility provided by the BRRD to apply 
certain resolution tools whenever a bank fails or is likely to fail (see below), the MSs in 
addition to designating national resolution authorities (NRAs) that are responsible for 
resolution may allocate to them further tools and powers33. Furthermore, they may 
decide as a minimum harmonization measure, whether to adopt Government Financial 
Stabilization Tools (GFST), whenever bank reaches to all the resolution terms under 
art.32 (1) as a measure of last resort.34 Hence, the BRRD allows to MSs an alternative 
to public support with GFST; therefore it appears that bailout of banks remain an 
option.35 The BRRD together with the SRM constitutes an alternative option to the 
implementation of the national corporate insolvency legislation.36 Both regimes 
provide effective means of resolving banks, which are failing or are likely to fail, 
wherein this case as a principle, post-evaluation RAs may conclude that there is a 
                                               
30 Ibid p.6 (par. 1.09) 
31 Pamela Lintner, Lira Qefalia, ‘Understanding Bank Recovery and Resolution in the EU: A 
Guidebook to the BRRD’, [2017], World Bank Group Finance & Markets FinSAC, p. 26 
32 Michael Schillig, ‘Resolution and Insolvency of Banks and Financial Institutions.’, [2016] 
Oxford, p.6 (par.1.09).  The SRM seeks to harmonize the resolution scheme by implementing 
unified conditions and secure a consistent application by assigning decisions to a central body. 
It seems that the SRM harmonized the utilized of the resolution tools but not the operation of 
resolution powers, which are remained upon the NRAs. See: Danny Busch, Mirik B. J. van Rijn 
& Marije Louisse, ‘How Single is the Single Resolution Mechanism?’, EBI, EBI Working Paper 
Series, [2019-no. 30], p.9-10 
33 BRRD Art 3, Art 37(9). See also, Art. 1(2) where it provides that MSs may endorse or sustain 
more stringent rules as long as they are not in dispute with the regulations and acts of the 
directive. Moreover, SRM regulation highlight through its recital 10 that the BRRD is a major 
step although it does not join to a decision making and it only provides minimum 
harmonization regulations. 
34 BRRD Art 56 (3)(4).  
35 Danny Busch, Mirik B. J. van Rijn & Marije Louisse, ‘How Single is the Single Resolution 
Mechanism?’, EBI, EBI Working Paper Series, [2019-no. 30], p.5-7 
36Michael Schillig, ‘Resolution and Insolvency of Banks and Financial Institutions’, [2016] 
Oxford, p.98 (para.4.51) 
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public interest in resolving banks instead of implementing insolvency under national 
legislation.37 
This is precisely the rationale behind the application of the EU special resolution 
framework for banks, i.e. a solution beyond the normal insolvency procedures in cases, 
where such proceedings appear unlikely to handle bank failures properly and 
adequately.38 Thus, NRAs intervention should always take into account the public 
interest, therefore, the resolution of a bank will be managed efficiently with minimal 
cost to taxpayers and the real economy. Moreover, in exceptional cases, the Single 
Resolution Fund (SRF) that controlled by the SRB and is bank financed may be accessed 
for a bank resolution.39  
 
2.2 Resolution conditions and objectives. 
 
Consequently, the determined conditions for bank resolution under the special 
resolution regime40 are the following. The bank shall consider as failing or likely to fail 
(FOLTF)41, there must be no other possible actions available to avert bank failure 
                                               
37 European Commission, ‘Report from the Commission to the European Parliament and the 
Council on the application and review of Directive 2014/59/EU (Bank Recovery and Resolution 
Directive) and Regulation 806/2014 (Single Resolution Mechanism Regulation), [30.4.2019] 
COM(2019) 213 final Brussels, p. 1 
38 Single Resolution Board, ‘Public Interest Assessment: SRB Approach’, [2019], p.4, available at 
<https://srb.europa.eu/sites/srbsite/files/2019-06-28_draft_pia_paper_v12.pdf>, accessed 23 
Oct 2019 
39 Single Resolution Board, ‘What is a Bank Resolution’,  available at 
<https://srb.europa.eu/en/content/what-bank-resolution>, accessed 23 Oct 2019  
40 BRRD, Art 32(1), SRMR, Art. 18(1) 
41 Ibid. The examiner of, whether an institution is FOLTF supposed to be the relevant banking 
supervisor, although the BRRD permits MSs to provide the power to RAs to conduct the 
research instead of the supervisor. Within the euro area, it is upon the ECB to decide whether 
an institution is deemed to be FOLTF after consultation with the SRB, or unless the latter 
decides on the matter and the ECB has not reacted within three days. After the bank identified 
as FOLTF, it is up to SRB to initiate the resolution proceedings and examine if the resolution 
prerequisites are fulfilled so as to take a decision for the huge and cross border banks, while 
NRAs are liable in the eurozone for the resolution of minor institutions and non-cross border 
banks. The implementation of certain resolution tools to tackle the failure of a bank and if and 
how much of the SRF may be used, i.e. the resolution scheme, is provided by the SRB through 
a quite complex voting procedure and veto powers by the European Commission and the 
Council. In particular, the EC may submit an objection to the scheme or challenging the public 
interests or unless if the scheme approved by the EC and enters into force. In case of the 
objections to the public interests, the Council may endorse the objections and only, in this 
case, the bank would wound up. Otherwise, the scheme would be modified and endorsed by 
the SRB. See the depicted diagram: Single Resolution Board, ‘What is a Bank Resolution’, 
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within a reasonable amount of time; for instance, private sector aid, monitoring 
measures, the write-down and/or conversion of capital tools and, last but not least as 
the most crucial of the above there must be public interest.42  
The interpretation of public interest is given by the Arts 32(5) and 18(5) under the 
BRRD and, the SRMR respectively. In particular, a resolution action to fulfill the public 
interest element shall be “necessary and proportionate to one or more of the 
resolution objectives” and “winding up of the institution under normal insolvency 
proceedings would not meet those resolution objectives to the same extent”.  It seems 
that, the public interest test estimated in relation with the BRRD resolution 
objectives,43 intends to ensure the continuity of critical functions, to prevent negative 
effects on the financial system, to reducing dependence on taxpayer funds and by that, 
safeguards the public funds, lastly, to protect depositors, investors, client capitals and 
assets.44 Herewith, the resolution may qualify as the restructuring of a financial 
institution, that uses the resolution tools to protect the above public interests45 and, 
only as an exemption to be given only if the winding-up within normal insolvency 
proceedings is not justified.46 Although, these resolution objectives are equally 
                                                                                                                                         
[2016], available at: <https://srb.europa.eu/en/content/what-bank-resolution>, accessed 23 
Oct 2019. The preconditions of, whether a bank is supposed to FOLTF under the BRRD Art 
32(4) are in brief when the institution breaches the conditions for continuing authorization 
and, by that justifying the withdrawal of the authorization by the competent authority or, 
when the liabilities surpass the assets-known as “balance sheet” insolvency-, whether the bank 
is unable to pay its debts-known as illiquidity or “cash flow” insolvency and finally, on a 
massive public financial aid requirement.  The FOLTF definition under the BRRD is quite 
ambiguous but provides the option to intervene early. A further elaboration regards to when 
an institution shall be deemed to be FOLTF provided by the European Banking Authority (EBA) 
guidelines (EBA/GL/2015/07).  See: Dominic Freudenthaler, Pamela Lintner, ‘Understanding 
Bank Recovery and Resolution in the EU: A Guidebook to the BRRD’, [2017], World Bank Group 
Finance & Markets FinSAC,  p.104,106  
42 Single Resolution Board, ‘Public Interest Assessment: SRB Approach’, [2019] Brussels, p.4-5, 
available at <https://srb.europa.eu/sites/srbsite/files/2019-06-28_draft_pia_paper_v12.pdf> 
accessed 23 Oct 2019 
43 Dominic Freudenthaler, Pamela Lintner, ‘Understanding Bank Recovery and Resolution in the 
EU: A Guidebook to the BRRD’, [2017], World Bank Group Finance & Markets FinSAC,  p.106 
44 BRRD Art 31&2, SRM Art 14 
45Single Resolution Board, ‘What is a Bank Resolution’,  available at: 
<https://srb.europa.eu/en/content/what-bank-resolution>, accessed 23 Oct 2019 
46 Silvia Merler, Bruegel, ‘Critical Functions and Public Interest in banking services: Need for 
clarification?’, [2017], European Parliament, Economic Governance Support Unit, PE 614.479, 
Abstract, available at 
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important,47 the BRRD explicitly declares that the safety of covered depositors is one 
of the most significant objectives of resolution.48 However, these resolution objectives 
are diverse, comprehensive, and quite general, hence, they are open to various 
interpretations which makes it extremely hard to assess in advance,  whether they can 
be met equally within normal insolvency proceedings i.e. liquidation.49 About that, 
Andrea Enria, Chair of the EBA argues that there are two distinct definitions of public 
interest, the EU approach and one more by national authorities.50 This illustrates the 
need for possibly a further elaboration for both notions of critical functions and public 
interest concerning that recent liquidation cases highlighted the exact above 
distinction.51(See Chapter III). 
 
2.3 The Resolution tools and powers. 
 
 
The BRRD resolution regime provides to the RAs a broad power to achieve the 
resolution objectives. The powers are applied as a package, known as the resolution 
tools that might be utilized individually or, along with others on a case by case basis, 
apart from the asset separation tool that is only applied in a conjunction with some 
other resolution tool.52 The tools are deemed to be four, which are the three transfer 
tools,53 particularly the sale of business tool, the bridge institution tool, and the 
abovementioned asset separate instrument. The bundle ends with the bail-in 
                                                                                                                                         
<http://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/IDAN/2017/614479/IPOL_IDA(2017)61447
9_EN.pdf> accessed 23 Oct 2019 
47 Maciej Podgorski, ‘General Articles; The Single Resolution Mechanism in Action. An analysis 
of the decision-making practice of the Single Resolution Board’, [2018] 38 Polish Y.B. Int'l L. 
229, available at LexisNexis, p.3 
48 BRRD Recital 71 
49 Dominic Freudenthaler, Pamela Lintner ‘Understanding Bank Recovery and Resolution in the 
EU: A Guidebook to the BRRD’, [2017], World Bank Group Finance & Markets FinSAC, p.107 
50 J Deslandes M Magnus, ‘Further harmonizing the EU Insolvency law from a banking 
resolution perspective’, [April 2018], European Parliament,  Economic Governance Support 
Unit PE 614.514, p.2, available at 
<http://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/BRIE/2018/614514/IPOL_BRI(2018)614514
_EN.pdf> accessed 25 Oct 2019 
51 Ibid  
52 Dominik Freudenthaler, ‘Understanding Bank Recovery and Resolution in the EU: A 
Guidebook to the BRRD’, [2017] World Bank Group Finance & Markets FinSAC, p. 32 
53 Ibid p.33 
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instrument, the most progressive of the tools provided to the RAs under the BRRD.54 
Additionally, the bailout of institutions through the Government financial stabilization 
tools in form of a public equity and a temporary public ownership instrument under 
the Arts 56, 57 and 58 of the BRRD are not theoretically defined as resolution tools but 
they may be utilized as ultimate ratio in a systemic crisis and after having exploited all 
resolution tools.55 To prepare the application of the tools and be effective, the BRRD 
provided a list of powers to the RAs. These general powers act as a foundation for the 
implementation of the resolution tools and having the same importance as the 
resolution tools.56 These powers and tools constitute an alternative option to the 
implementation of the national insolvency law, permitting RAs to take crucial and 
quick measures to avert contagion and sustain important services.57 
 
 
2.4 The scope of the new regulatory framework. 
 
 
The BRRD’S scope is equivalent to the EU Capital Requirements Directive (CRD IV)58; it 
therefore applies first and foremost to financial institutions and huge investment firms 
with a seed capital of EUR 730.000 established in the EU59. Those are individual 
deposit-taking institutions60 and 730k investment companies61 in a holding business 
organization and to the ‘big bank’ parent and its deposit-taking, and 730k securities 
affiliates into the big bank form. It also applies to financial holding firms62 and parent 
financial holding businesses63 that settled in the EU and which may be subsidiaries of 
another parent company established in a different Member State. Nonetheless, it may 
be applicable to parent credit holding enterprises, which can be subsidiaries of parent 
                                               
54 Jeremy Jennings-Mares, ‘Understanding Bank Recovery and Resolution in the EU: A 
Guidebook to the BRRD’, [2017] World Bank Group Finance & Markets FinSAC, p. 111 and 
BRRD Art.37 (3) and SRMR Art.22(2) 
55 Ibid p.33 
56 Ibid p.33,34 (BRRD Art. 63) 
57 Michael Schillig, ‘Resolution and Insolvency of Banks and Financial Institutions’, [2016] 
Oxford, p. 9 (par. 1.13) 
58 BRRD, Recital (11) 
59 Ibid, Art. 1(a), Art.2 (23) 
60 Ibid, Art. 2 (1)(2) 
61 Ibid, Art 2(3) 
62 Ibid, Art. 1(c), Art 2 (1)(9) and CRR, Art 4(1)(20) 
63 Ibid, Art 1(d), Art 2 (1)(12) and CRR, Art.4 (1)(30) 
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companies set up into third states in the context of the worldwide multi-bank model.64 
The recovery and resolution regime also extends according to the BRRD Art 1(1)(c) and 
(d) respectively, to ‘mixed financial holding companies’ and ‘mixed-activity holding 
companies’65 set up into the EU and ‘parent mixed financial holding companies in a 
Member State’ as well as, ‘Union parent mixed financial holding companies’.66 To end 
with, concerning Art 1(1) (e) the Directive applies to ‘branches of institutions’ having 
their headquarter external the EU in line with the particular conditions presented for 
in the Directive. Except from the financial holding firms, the financial institutions 
settled in the EU will be included whether they are the affiliate of a credit institution or 
an investment company or of one of the holding company forms in which the BRRD 
applies under the prerequisite that is under the monitoring of the parent company on 
a consolidated form in accordance to the provisions of the CRR. 67 
However, the scope of the Directive generally extends to all kinds of sizes of businesses 
not only to systemically important institutions because even the collapse of minor 
firms may lead to dramatic results for the economy as it appears to be hard to foresee 
beforehand the systemic importance of a company. National authorities take into 
consideration all the relevant elements of an enterprise such as the size, complexity, 
and interconnection with other institutions as well as the risk profile, the nature of a 
company and its shareholding form, as part of the resolution tools and into the 
implementation of the preparation and prevention framework, especially, for the 
public interest factor of the resolution activating.68  
 
 
2.5 A form of interconnection between the EU resolution framework and the ‘normal’ 
insolvency law. 
 
 
Virtually, both resolution regimes through their scope of application dislodge the valid 
national insolvency legislation, while the latter used as a supplement to the otherwise 
partial framework under the BRRD and SRMR. Therefore, the national insolvency law is 
                                               
64 Ibid, Art 2(1)(13) and CRR Art.4(1)(31) 
65 Ibid, Art 2 (1)(10) (11) 
66 Ibid, Art 2 (1)(14)(15) 
67 Michael Schillig, ‘Resolution and Insolvency of Banks and Financial Institutions’, [2016] 
Oxford, p.98-100 
68 Ibid, p.100 (para.4.54) 
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applicable in circumstances where the resolution would not meet the dominant public 
interest element and the failing bank would be wound up.69 Under this perspective 
and according to recital 45 of the BRRD providing that, a failing bank shall as a matter 
of principle be liquidated, it seems that winding up constitute a default option to 
handle an institution collapse and its most likelihood, as it has been argued that the 
additional safety net of resolution it is only for certain and not for many.70 
Furthermore, national insolvency legislation is valid when the residual part would be 
liquidated after the partial transfer of an institution, or when it may consider factors 
like transaction evasion, the handling and set-off of secured creditors and the position 
of various classes of creditors generally. A liquidation analysis is also required regards 
to the no-creditor-worse-off rule based on national insolvency law.71 In general terms, 
the BRRD and the SRMR have greatly assisted in harmonizing EU insolvency law for 
banks by delegating the resolution powers to the RAs and not to the courts72, which 
has a vital role within normal insolvency proceedings, as are those that may order the 
initiation of procedures and oversees the actions of the officeholders.73 Both 
resolution regimes are administrative in character, which means that RAs will be in 
charge of powers to intervene in an institution’s structure and policy and its 
proprietary rights and into the rights of its stockholders and creditors.74 Thus, a 
balanced scheme of court review is needed according to constitutional 
preconditions.75 Under the BRRD and SRM, the ex-post judicial control is obligatory, 
while the ex-ante court review is discretionary to the MSs.76 
 
                                               
69 Ibid, p.9 (para. 1.13) 
70 J. Deslandes and M. Magnus, ‘Further harmonizing EU Insolvency law from a banking 
resolution perspective’, [2018] PE 614.514 European Parliament, Economic Governance 
Support Unit, p.1-2 
71 Michael Schillig, ‘Resolution and Insolvency of Banks and Financial Institutions’, [2016] 
Oxford, p. 9 (para.1.13) 
72J. Deslandes and M. Magnus, ‘Further harmonizing EU Insolvency law from a banking 
resolution perspective’,[2018] PE 614.514, European Parliament, Economic Governance 
Support Unit, p. 1 
73 Michael Schillig, ‘Resolution and Insolvency of Banks and Financial Institutions’, [2016] 
Oxford, p. 109 (para. 5.01) 
74 Ibid (para. 5.02) 
75 Ibid p. 111 (para. 5.04) 
76 Ibid p.116 (para. 5.10) 
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With the above, resolution proceedings shall be used as the umbrella term that 
includes the implementation of resolution tools and powers as well as, normal 
insolvency legislation, with their inter-relation still be in progress. The BRRD 
discriminate among resolution tools and powers and normal insolvency procedures 
under the Art.2&1(1) and (47). The matter is that even when the prerequisites for 
public interest are not fulfilled and the standard insolvency law is applied the case of 
financial difficulties is still considered to be ‘resolved’ although, through liquidation or 
reorganization.77 Therefore, the distance among the two proceedings seems to be to 
the methods that offer. The question is, whether the outcome that offers is 
significantly different and what is that exactly. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                               
77 Ibid p. 10-11 (para. 1.16) 
   
 -18- 
Chapter II: Preparation and prevention as well as early intervention 
under the BRRD. 
 
The four pillars under the BRRD, i.e. (i) the preparation and prevention, (ii) early 
intervention, (iii) resolution tools and powers, and (iv) the required resolution 
financing arrangements or a SRF under the SRM, supplement each other to reach the 
aforementioned objectives of the recovery and resolution framework; which are to 
sustain financial stability in crisis and to reduce losses for society without the necessity 
to depend on taxpayer assist.78 
 
1. Recovery and Resolution plans. 
 
These elements that are enclosed in EU recovery and resolution rulebook appeared to 
be the answer to the financial crisis dilemma about the government recapitalization or 
straight liquidation, and about the fact that the cross border financial institutions were 
‘international in life but national in death’.79  
The preparation and prevention rule under the BRRD is included in the supervision 
process of a bank and encompasses recovery and resolution plans, the resolvability 
examination and intra-group fiscal assist.80 Along with the application of the BRRD, 
recovery plans81 has been accepted as an essential and repeated aspect of regular 
monitoring as it provides useful information to financial institutions and supervisors. 
They are prepared and preserved by the bank in contrast from resolution plans,82 
which are drawing-up by the RAs,83 together with competent supervisory authorities 
                                               
78 Ibid p. 9 
79 Pamela Lintner ‘Overview on the BRRD’, [2015], Financial Sector Advisory Center (FinSAC) 
Workshop, World Bank Group FinSAC, p. 9 
80 Michael Schillig, ‘Resolution and Insolvency of Banks and Financial Institutions’, [2016] 
Oxford, p.166 
81 BRRD Arts 5-9 and SECTION A of the ANNEX, where a list of info is provided to be contained 
into recovery planning.  
82 Ibid Arts 10-14 and SECTION B of the ANNEX 
83 Emmeline van Heukelem, ‘Understanding Bank Recovery and Resolution in the EU: A 
Guidebook to the BRRD’, [2017]  World Bank Group Finance&Markets FinSAC, p. 50,52 
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and RAs of the jurisdictions, where branches are established.84 With the recovery 
plans, measures are defined to be taken by the management in case of a significant 
bank financial distress to restore it to financial strength. Consequently, a double 
hypothetical event is required, composed by a hypothetical crisis scenario and 
hypothetical measures to be developed.85 The bank must examine the credibility and 
feasibility of the recovery options as this would demonstrate the possibility of 
recoverability and the bank’s readiness to identify several issues.86 
Additionally, the preparation of resolution plans for each bank provides the resolution 
actions which might be taken when the bank meets the prerequisites for resolution.87 
The RAs may ask for the needed information to draft resolution plans directly from 
banks and supervisory bodies. The resolution planning is initiated with the examination 
of whether it is feasible and credible the liquidation under the normal insolvency 
procedures, and if not then the RAs are supposed to determine the resolution strategy 
for banks along with the tools and powers.88 Resolvability assessment89 occurs at the 
same time as the setting up of the resolution plans and, if it reaches potential 
impediments then the bank may suggest some measures to remedy the situation or, 
the RAs along with the Competent Authorities (CAs), may request the bank to apply 
alternative measures.90 Based on the resolvability assessment the minimum 
requirement and eligible liabilities (MREL) are determined91 which are expressed as a 
proportion of the whole obligations and own funds of the bank, where the numerator 
consists of own capitals and an exact type of duties. The MREL must make sure that 
there is adequate absorb loss capacity by stockholders and lenders to permit an 
                                               
84 Michael Schillig, ‘Resolution and Insolvency of Banks and Financial Institutions’, [2016] 
Oxford, p.170 (para 7.14) 
85 Ibid p. 167 
86Emmeline van Heukelem, ‘Understanding Bank Recovery and Resolution in the EU: A 
Guidebook to the BRRD’, [2017] World Bank Group Finance&Markets FinSAC, p. 53 
87 Michael Schillig, ‘Resolution and Insolvency of Banks and Financial Institutions’, [2016] 
Oxford, p. 170 (para. 7.14) 
88 Georg Merc, ‘Understanding Bank Recovery and Resolution in the EU: A Guidebook to the 
BRRD’, [2017] World Bank Group Finance&Markets FinSAC, p.73 
89 BRRD Arts 15-28 and SECTION C of the annex.  
90 Michael Schillig, ‘Resolution and Insolvency of Banks and Financial Institutions’, [2016] 
Oxford, p 172 (para.7.16) 
91 Georg Merc, ‘Understanding Bank Recovery and Resolution in the EU: A Guidebook to the 
BRRD’, [2017] World Bank Group Finance&Markets FinSAC, p.74 
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effectual bail-in and organized resolution without the creation of additional contagion 
and resort to public resources.92 
 
 
2. The early intervention measures. 
 
The notion of balance sheet insolvency raises hard issues of the appraisal of assets and 
liabilities93 and, it frequently is discovered quite late.94 Financial assets seemed to be 
unstable and bank’s balance sheet notably complex. A bank is expected to be capable 
to attract enough deposits to stay able to pay its debts as they become due. Also, 
reports about a bank’s downfall may initiate a crisis of systemic size and it might 
extend to other equally situated banks, as well as injuring deposit insurance and 
resolution funds.95 The question is when does an intervention should take place? Prior 
or post the bank turns to be no longer viable i.e. insolvent? 
Ever since the 30’s the bank supervisor duties were extended constantly, as a reaction 
to technological progress, globalization, innovative products and structural 
alterations.96 These, have led to additional regulatory requires such as, the protection 
of costumers and society in general.97 For a better understanding of the early 
intervention measures (EIMs) under the BRRD, we need to look through the two main 
                                               
92 Ibid p.83 
93 According to section (1) and (2) of section 123 under the Insolvency Act 1986, an institution 
is considered unable to pay its debts, inter alia, whether it is reviewed by the court that the 
institution could not pay its debts as they fall due and, if the court finds that the value of an 
institution’s assets is less than the percentage of its liabilities considering its possible liabilities. 
The former is defined as cash-flow insolvency whilst, the latter determined as balance-sheet 
insolvency but this notion cannot be taken strictly because an institution’s statutory balance 
sheet may exclude some possible assets and liabilities.  See: Bny Corporate Trustee Services 
Limited and others (Respondents) v Neuberger Berman Europe Ltd (on behalf of Sealink 
Funding Ltd) and others (Appellants), Bny Corporate Trustee Services Limited and others 
(Respondents) v Eurosail-UK 2007-3BL PLC (Appellant), [2013] UKSC 28 [2011] EWCA Civ 227, 
para.1, available at: <https://www.bailii.org/uk/cases/UKSC/2013/28.html>, accessed 31 Oct 
2019 
94 Michael Schillig, ‘Resolution and Insolvency of Banks and Financial Institutions’, [2016] 
Oxfrod, p. 195 (para. 8.03) 
95 Ibid p.195 (para.8.03) 
96 Eva Hüpkes, ‘Insolvency – why a special regime for banks?’, [2002] Current Developments in 
Monetary and Financial Law, Vol. 3 (International Monetary Fund, Washington DC), available 
at SSRN, p. 2 
97 Ibid p.2 
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differences between the approaches to insolvency by a bank supervisor versus under 
the general insolvency law. Firstly, the triggers for supervisory activities precede 
insolvency and the circumstances for initiating proceedings under general insolvency 
law. Under the latter, it is most common, that the creditors or the debtors to initiate 
actions and not the supervisor.98 Secondly, there are procedural differentiations 
between special banking rules and general insolvency legislation.99 The banking rules 
at large, provide broad powers to the bank supervisor to intervene and to take 
remedial measures, while they have extensive discretion to choose the closure of a 
bank in due time.100 In contrast, insolvency law specifies closely the preconditions for 
the initiation of proceedings, having as a trigger point the debtor institution’s difficulty 
to meet its liabilities. Although, in the case of a bank is that the latter condition is not 
considered as evidence of insolvency and might be because of a temporary lack of 
liquidity.101 Moreover, the banks in contrast with other companies, even with financial 
deficiencies can continue paying creditors because of a continuing source of cash flow 
from depositors. Therefore, the general insolvency law seems quite unfit for banks.102 
Given that, it is upon the bank supervisor to appraise bank’s capital and to assess the 
quality of its assets, as well as to decide whether a bank is insolvent and needs to be 
closed. Consequently, the insolvency is not the primary relevant trigger for bank 
intervention, after this phase it would be too late to intervene efficiently.103  
 
The aforesaid make an early intervention a necessity before a bank proves to be 
officially insolvent.104 The raison d'être of prudential regulation and supervision is to 
secure a close monitoring of the bank’s fiscal state of affairs. The bank supervisor 
                                               
98 Ibid p.9 
99 Ibid p.9 
100 Ibid p.9-10 
101 Ibid p.10 
102 Ibid p. 10 
103 Ibid p.10 
104 Michael Schillig, ‘Resolution and Insolvency of Banks and Financial Institutions’, [2016] 
Oxford, p. 195 (para. 8.03) 
   
 -22- 
should intervene before the financial weaknesses of a bank cost an excessive debt to 
the detriment of creditors.105 
Accordingly, the powers of CAs to intervene at an early stage in an institution’s capital 
regulatory position decline are extended under the BRRD.106 Thus, they may take 
additional measures to those that CRD already provide, whether a bank stops to meet 
or is likely to infringe its regulatory capital conditions and prior the need of application 
of the resolution tools.107 In particular, MSs shall ensure that CAs have at their disposal 
the power, inter alia, to assemble shareholders’ meeting to raise institution’s finances 
and also may obtain through on-site inspections, and provide to the RAs all the needed 
information, in order to update the resolution plan and prepare for the possible 
resolution of the bank. Moreover, the supervisor may require the application of 
measures that are established in the recovery plan, a phase that seems to be the 
crucial test of the ex-ante part of EIMs. Whether the action under bank’s recovery plan 
seems to be inadequate the supervisor may ask for extra vigorous alternative actions 
such as changes to the institution’s strategy or its legal and operational structures or 
even the negotiation of debt reform.108 The BRRD powers are complementary and are 
taken without prejudice109 to the referred measures under the Art.104 of the CRD, and 
to the ECB’S supervisory powers under the Art.16 of the SSMR.110 
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Concerning the provisions under the BRRD, a clear distinction is developed between 
the ongoing supervision that includes the EIMs and the resolution.111 The ECB and SRB 
argued in several cases, for instance in the Banco Popular, as well as in the Veneto 
Banca, that there were no available supervisory actions, or EIMs that could reinstate 
the liquidity position of a bank, or avert the financial institution’s collapse.112 
Moreover, coordination among authorities is noted through the early intervention 
stage, with the RAs getting involved only when the conditions of triggering resolution 
are fulfilled.113 In relation to that, the triggers of EIMs seems reasonable to base on 
certain criteria that banks and financial institutions are subject to, such as the 
continuing supervision for safety and soundness in regards to risk-based capital, 
leverage, huge exposures, and the management of risk, corporate authority and 
liquidity. Nonetheless, these trigger conditions should be easily noticeable and 
powerful.114  
 
         2.1 The triggers of EIMs 
 
 
The lack of certainty about when exactly CAs can apply EIMs, constitute an important 
disadvantage of the early intervention process.115 To ensure consistent application of 
the trigger conditions, the EBA issued guidelines according to the BRRD Art. 27(4), 
which gives direction to CAs in respect of, which conditions they should consider the 
application of EIMs to banks.116 EBA might develop draft regulatory technical options 
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to define a minimum set of triggers for the use of EIMs.117  In particular, a core 
element of EBA guidelines is to specify a number of common indicators and conditions 
that may be used by CAs in all the MSs.118 Hence, EBA guidelines has been developed 
on alternative technical options according to which, (i) the CAs assess the need to 
implement EIMs, based on the supervisory review and evaluation process (SREP)119 
and its outcomes, or based on a separate analysis, parallel to SREP, and under (ii) 
qualitative based triggers and/or on a quantitative type of triggers.120  
A qualitative based framework of activations can be established by a detailed   
description of the factors, especially of the results of the SREP that CAs considered 
when examining the need to apply EIMs.121 Whilst, quantitative based of triggers might 
be developed by determining a group of quantitative metrics with predetermined 
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all-important banks into eurozone, which now are aware of what to expect. The ECB sent out 
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thresholds, the infringement of which, may initiate the need to apply EIMs.122 The 
former type of triggers, may be given convergence of supervisory practices within EU, 
but at the same time, provide to the CAs a high level of discretion, while the 
quantitative indicators may be defined by the guidelines to implement throughout the 
EU, as well as set up the thresholds for the triggering of EIMs.123  Certain events are 
listed under the BRRD as triggers,124 which mainly are fast decline economic 
conditions, such as failing liquidity situation, rising level of leverage or a boost of non-
performing loans (NPL) portfolios, or concentration of exposures as assessed on the 
basis of a group of triggers that include institution’s own funds requisite, plus 1.5 
proportion points. Furthermore, regulatory infringements or an important 
deterioration of institution’s capital situation (CRR/CRD IV) may also activate EIMs in 
the context of which the supervisor shall act and might order to remove and replace 
members of the senior management and management body.125 In case the 
replacement supposed to inadequate to cure the situation, the supervisor can assign 
temporary administrators to the bank.126  
Attempting to look in-depth the triggers of EIMs the most crucial points to mention are 
the follow. The general approach over the triggers is that they do not establish an 
automatic application of EIMs; instead they are support CAs into make decisions.127 An 
argument has been made under the EBA’s Banking Stakeholder Group (BSG)128 
response over the guidelines that there is a connection among the recovery plans, 
recovery indicators, recovery supervision, the commencement of recovery measures 
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and the triggers of EIMs.129 Hence, CAs must be conscious of the recovery options 
undertaken by each bank and should consider any of its recovery measures when 
assessing the most suitable measure to take, whether the institution meets the early 
intervention conditions.130 Moreover, the trigger condition of capital infringements 
(CRR/CRD IV) seems to be extremely ambiguous and provide a lot of discretion to the 
supervisor, thus, it must be seen in connection with the monitoring of key indicators 
under the SREP requirements.131 Therefore, under EBA guidelines, the EIMs must be 
considered in relation to capital infringements, whether the overall or individual 
institution SREP score is 4.132 In this occasion, CAs must consider to gather information 
for the assessment of the institution’s assets and liabilities according to the BRRD 
Art.27 (1) (h).133 Furthermore, other circumstances for further investigation could be 
the identification of material changes, or anomalies in the monitoring of the SREPs key 
indicators. In particular, EBA guidelines established an absolute minimum trigger of 
1.5% above banks own funds that is mostly applicable to smaller institutions without 
additional set buffers.134 Moreover, EIMs might be activated by some significant events 
that may have an impact on a bank’s financial condition, for instance, a major 
operational risk because of fraud, natural disaster, or rating downgrades.135 
 
In regards to both types of triggers, present several possible pros and cons. For 
instance, the wide discretion that is given to CAs under the qualitative type of triggers 
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does not abolish the risk of supervisory forbearance.136 During an institution’s decline, 
supervisors might forbear to permit a bank to recover when the economy enhances 
and by that, evade the embarrassment of having the bank collapse under their 
control.137 Meanwhile, under quantitative based framework, the issue of excessive 
regulatory forbearance may be decreased,138 consider the fact that under certain 
quantitative indicators with predefined thresholds that qualified as trigger conditions, 
cannot be manipulated, or be dependent on subjective evaluation.139 Additionally, 
before the implementation of the BRRD, bank creditors and shareholders’ did not have 
standing in the proceedings administered by the bank supervisor and they were not 
served with documents relating to the proceedings; consequently, such absence 
appeared to be a lack of due process.140 Now, a potential benefit under the 
quantitative type of triggers is that clarity and transparency are submitted to market 
participants and banks concerning triggers of EIMs.141 On the other hand, with the 
quantitative-based framework, room for any estimation is confined, and supervisors 
may be compelled to trigger intervention even though they do not believe that it will 
provide the best possible results. Moreover, there is a possibility of exaggeration by 
the markets whenever banks approached any of the quantitative thresholds and this 
can cause a bank run.142 Hereafter, it is evident that the balancing is extremely delicate 
to the point that EIMs may even produce contrary and unwanted results from its initial 
purpose, defined by the Basel Committee as: ‘adopting a forward-looking approach to 
supervision through early intervention can prevent an identified weakness from 
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developing into a threat to safety and soundness. This is particularly true for highly 
complex and bank-specific issues (e.g. liquidity risk) where effective supervisory actions 
must be tailored to a bank’s individual circumstances’.143  
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Chapter III: The defining line of the public interest assessment; a sort of 
complexity.  
 
As it has been already mentioned, Art. 32 of the BRRD establish the resolution 
conditions of credit institutions and investment companies based on which a 
resolution action might be taken. 
 
1. Further elaboration in relation to the resolution triggers. 
 
In respect of the first condition, an institution must be deemed as FOLTF by the CAs 
after consultation with the RA or in reverse if so the Member State provides, and the 
RA is aware of the necessary information for the determination of failure.144 When the 
CA determines the FOLTF condition it must do so based on the outcomes of SREP 
according to Art.97 of CRD.145 The RAs must be in discussion and consultation with the 
CAs about the results of their assessments.146 According to the first prerequisite of 
whether an institution shall be deemed as FOLTF, the notion ‘own funds’ of a bank 
composed of the sum of its Tier 1 and Tier 2 capital under Art.72 of the CRR.147 Hence, 
it is depicted once again that the interrelation between the FOLTF assessment and the 
early intervention phase, as this ‘regulatory threshold’ based on minimal capital 
sufficiency requirements represents the foundation of resolution regimes and, permits 
to the CAs to intervene at early stages of an institution’s financial difficulties prior the 
appearance of illiquidity or a negative net worth.148 
EBA guidelines are further elaborated on the interpretation of the different cases in 
when an institution must be deemed as FOLTF to promote the conjunction of 
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supervisory and resolution acts.149 According to those, the determination must be 
based on certain objective elements150 and are focusing more on the prerequisites 
specified under the Art32 (4) (a), (b) and (c).151 Nonetheless, the determination stays 
an expert judgment and it’s not an automatic result from any of these objective 
elements alone.152 
 
Furthermore, the resolution conditions may not always be met simultaneously; several 
examples can be used to illustrate the situations in which a bank may be considered as 
FOLTF but still the conditions to take resolution action under the Art. 32(1) (b) and (c) 
are not met.153 For instance, a very small non-important institution that does not carry 
out critical functions is envisaged to face important losses and its assets are expected 
to be less than its liabilities. Consequently, it should be deemed that it is FOLTF based 
on the prerequisites of Art.32 (4) and the EBA guidelines.154 Nevertheless, if the RA 
demonstrates that the institution can be liquidated under normal insolvency 
proceedings then the resolution action is not necessarily in the public interest.155 
Taking into consideration, as well, that in the case of a failing bank the initial option is 
liquidation under insolvency law156 and only as a second option157 whether there is a 
public interest to keep a failing bank or parts of it alive it may be resolved as per BRRD 
and SRMR158 with the application of the resolution tools.159 
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2. Crucial European banking cases after the implementation of the BRRD. 
     2.1 An overview of the Veneto Banca and Banca Popolare di Vicenza (Veneto banks) cases. 
 
As demonstrated by certain liquidation cases, it has been evaluated differently under 
the EU approach and national approach whether the resolution of a bank is in the 
public interest or, whether it must be liquidated.160 The orderly liquidation of the 
Veneto banks161 highlights some crucial points that are worth mentioning. The ECB in 
late June 2017 acknowledged that both Italian banks constantly infringed supervisory 
capital requirements and were deemed as FOLTF.162 At the same time, the SRB 
declared that none of these banks supply critical functions and by extension, their 
collapse would not affect dramatically the financial stability. Thus, there was no public 
interest to vindicate resolution action therefore both banks were liquidated under 
normal insolvency procedures nationally, supervised by the Banca d’ Italia as the 
NRA.163 A few days later, the European Commission authorized the national support 
measures for Veneto Banks liquidation on which were included the transfer of the 
good business i.e. performing loans, financial securities, senior bonds and deposits, 
branches and staff of the bank to Intesa San Paolo (ISP).164 Moreover, the transfer of 
additional assets mostly non-performing loans (NPL) to SGA, the bail-in of stockholders 
and subordinated lenders, a capital injection by the Italian treasury in ISP.165 
Additionally, they have encompassed measures of funding of the entity in liquidation 
by ISP and a national assurance to ISP on legal risks up to the amount of €1.5 billion.166 
In conclusion, the good business was sold to ISP subject to a cash injection by the 
government while the NPLs and other assets were wound down by the SGA.167 The 
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Italian Treasury held a first rank claim of €4.8 billion against the Veneto banks as well 
as ISP that detained a second rank claim ensured by the government.168  
 
The mentioned before measures taken for the liquidation of Veneto Banks are 
remarkably similar to certain resolution actions that had been taken in other EU MSs 
during the crisis169 and at first sight seemed to form a resolution case according to the 
EU law.170 In particular, the sale of good business to another entity was an action that 
was taken for the resolution of several Greek banks.171 At the same time, Hellenic 
Financial Stability Fund (HFSF) proceeded to a great deal of cash injections in the bank 
in liquidation to balance the transferred deposits with adequate amounts of assets, 
mainly with performing loans.172 As an example, the Panellinia bank was resolved with 
the transfer of liabilities to Piraeus bank, while the difference among the liabilities and 
assets was funded by the State.173 The Commission argued that, even though Greece 
not incorporated the BRRD into domestic law, the supporting measure matched 
perfectly to the sale of business tool174 and therefore checked whether the aid was in 
breach with BRRD provisions. Moreover, the Italian decree legislation pinpoints that 
the application of normal insolvency procedures may lead to dramatic results for the 
financial industry, a quite similar rationale to the resolution objectives established in 
Art. 31(2) BRRD and with that it justified the need for special insolvency procedures 
with the requirement of additional tools.175 
 
Despite the above similarities, the decision of the SRB, as the competent RA, it was 
that the criterion for public interest was not satisfied in the case of Veneto banks, as 
well as the Commission approved the aid measures as liquidation under normal 
insolvency proceedings and not as resolution action.176 In particular, the SRB rejected 
                                               
168 Ibid  
169 Ibid p.4 
170 Ibid p.5 
171 Ibid p.4 
172 Ibid  
173 Ibid p.6 
174 Ibid and BRRD Art.38 
175 Ibid p.5,6 
176 Ibid p.6 
   
 -33- 
public interest on the grounds of the absence of any critical functions177, because of 
Bank’s deposit and lending activities were provided to a few third parties and due to 
the possibility of their replacement in a suitable manner and in a reasonable time.178 
Thus, these activities were not measured critical per se.179 Great interest presents the 
following fact. Due to the arrangement of the operation, the Veneto banks cases were 
compared with the case of Spanish Banco Popular, with the similarity to be located 
into the sale and transfer of part of the institution to another entity, as it constitutes a 
resolution tool under Art.38 BRRD.180 Notwithstanding, the difference lies in the fact 
that the SRB concluded that the deposit-taking activities and lending activities of the 
Spanish bank composed critical functions,181 hence acknowledged the existence of 
public interest. 
 
Furthermore, one more reason that SRB rejected the existence of public interest was 
that there was no danger to financial stability and normal insolvency proceedings 
offered the same level of protection.182 In addition, the SRB stated that the liquidation 
of a traditional bank under normal insolvency actions with a precise €62.5 billion 
balance sheet does not challenge financial stability as far as the bank interconnected 
with other credit institutions. According to that, Andrea Enria argued that the SRB 
decision ‘set the bar for resolution very high’.183 Moreover, the SRB may dismiss the 
risk of a bank run but did not clarify whether the liquidation of Veneto Banks 
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concerned the recourse to public funds for the protection of the unsecured senior 
creditors that are not covered by deposit guarantee schemes.184 As for the reasoning 
of the Commission’s approval, it seemed that the estimation of liquidation aid under 
national supporting measures has the same grounds as the estimation of restructuring 
support.185 The two different definitions of public interest was the result of the 
prediction by the EU legal framework to grant national support to allay financial 
disturbance at a local level,186 under that the two different approaches seem to justify. 
Moreover, the Commission stated that the sale process of the good business of the 
Veneto banks was opened, transparent and fair.187 
 
 
2.2 Resolution vs. Liquidation. 
 
 
The EU resolution framework provides that the implementation of resolution tools 
and, the liquidation under normal insolvency procedures constitute two different 
options.188 Still, the latter may take place even when the resolution tools are applied 
and a part of a failing institution will be liquidated under Art. 22.5 SRMR.189 Moreover, 
the normal insolvency procedures are the alternative scenario utilized to define if the 
resolution breached the fundamental rights of creditors, stockholders, and deposit 
safeguard mechanisms.190 Thus, it seems that normal insolvency constitutes a 
comparative measure, as the SRMR provides that an estimate must be made of 
whether the treatment of creditors and shareholders would vary under standard 
insolvency proceedings compared with the actual treatment that receive under 
resolution.191 Also, the BRRD explicitly provides that ‘no creditor shall incur greater 
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losses than would have been incurred if the institution...had been wound up under 
normal insolvency proceedings’.192  
In addition, the BRRD defined differently both proceedings; the resolution is exactly 
the application of the four resolution tools to attain one, or more of the resolution 
objectives193. Contrastingly, normal insolvency proceedings specified as joint 
procedures that involve the fully or partially divestiture of a debtor and, the 
engagement of a liquidator, or an administrator normally applicable at a national level 
to institutions.194 Moreover, as it has been already mentioned it is the default option 
when a bank is collapsing,195 while the resolution is a step taken prior to the 
liquidation, when a bank is deemed as FOLTF.196 Additionally, the latter contributing to 
the restructuring of the bank and not to its direct closing197 and, by that allowing the 
continuity and maintenance of bank’s critical functions unlike when the bank fall in 
liquidation and all liabilities fall due automatically.198 Thus, the goal of liquidation is the 
sale of assets in contrast with the resolution that seeks to ensure early and flexible 
triggers.199 In respect of that, the “fire sale” of assets that liquidation implies might be 
harmful to the creditors’ interests200 which their value is increasing under 
liquidation.201 
Under the BRRD and its resolution process, the RA passes losses to the creditors and 
existing risk holders without formal liquidation.202 Moreover, resolution regimes aim at 
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the No Creditor Worse Off than in Liquidation (NCWOL) principle,203 in context of the 
comparative role of normal insolvency proceedings. Through the NCWOL and the 
procedure that should be followed it must be defined, whether the creditors and 
shareholders’ affected by resolution have a right to compensation of what it has been 
allocated to them as per resolution action.204 In other words, they must obtain at least 
what they would have received in a liquidation of the institution.205 
In particular, the BRRD provides the above treatment for stockholders and creditors 
under its Arts 73 and 75 in case of when the resolution tools of partial transfers and 
the bail-in mechanism get activated.206  Final, generally, an effective insolvency regime 
through its proceedings must permit a feasible institution that facing some financial 
distress to restructure its debts and be able to continue trading.207 Nevertheless, in 
some States, there is not yet developed such insolvency proceedings that would 
manage to reach such objectives,208 while in contrast, the BRRD stressed that 
resolution is not justifying the withdrawal of counterparties from their obligations and 
suspends the contractual termination rights.209 Thus, central clearing schemes shall not 
interrupt a bank under resolution from trading.210 
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2.3 The Banco Popular (BP) case vs. the Veneto Banks case. 
 
Resolution and liquidation have significant differences in the scope of legislation which 
applied to the utilized of public funding.211 While in resolution the use of public 
resources depends on both scopes of the BRRD and the State aid, in liquidation it is 
only contingent to the State aid requirement of a minor burden-sharing of equity and 
junior debt.212 Hence, the use of public funds in case of resolution with the sale of the 
business to a purchaser needs the preliminary requirement of bail-in213 of creditors 
and stockholders equal to 8% of the bank’s total liabilities prior the option of using the 
funds from the SRF, which is depended on the Commission’s State aid appraisal;214 
while for the use of public money under liquidation the State aid frame involves only a 
preliminary contribution of equity and debt.215 By comparing the BP case-the only 
resolution that was performed after the SRMR provisions came in force-216with the 
Italian banks case, the practical effects of these two dissimilar legal scopes are 
illustrated217 and lead to some significant questions in respect of the Banking Union.218  
 
Particularly, the BP resolution represents a milestone in the growth of the Banking 
Union, as with that market participants could monitor how the institution’s capital 
structure would be used when it handles financial difficulties and whether the 
creditors, taxpayers’ interests and financial stability would be effectively protected and 
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balanced. 219 With the BP the SRB for the first time used its powers220 to write down 
and restructure the bank’s own funds and the sale of the business in the context of the 
sale of business tool into the Banco Santander.221 Furthermore, as to the common 
ground of both cases is that the senior debt remained untouched222 as in the Veneto 
banks the subordinated debt was wiped out,223 while in Popular case was used, with 
the difference that this time it was placed under the bail-in.224 Some cases that 
encompassed only the application of the State aid system on burden-sharing under the 
application of the BRRD were developed in 2015 before the Spanish bank case and 
consequently in absence of the implementation of the bail-in tool.225 
 
The difficulties for BP initiated in 2016, and in April of 2017, the chairperson required 
the capital increase of the institution and envisaged the possibility of selling the bank 
to a participant.226 Essentially, the bank faced growing deposit outflows, as its share 
price fell dramatically from 69 to 32 cents and the ECB on early June decided that the 
condition of FOLTF was fulfilled, under the fact that bank was unable to pay its debts 
or other liabilities, while the SRB declared that the other two conditions for resolution 
were satisfied as well.227 Continuously, the SRB endorsed the sale of the BP to 
Santander for one euro and with that sustained its operation as a member of the 
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group Santander;228 while the sale of the business was joined by a 7 billion euro 
fundraise from the Santander and a 3.3 billion euro bail-in of debt and equity.229  
 
In contrast, in the case of the Veneto and Vicenza banks the purchaser i.e. ISP, was the 
one that appeared to be favored from the State liquidation aid.230 As a consequence, it 
seems that with the different regulations for the use of public funds in resolution and 
liquidation under the scope of EU legislation a similar operation can lead to varying 
results concerning the creditors, taxpayers and the acquiring institution.231 At this 
point, it is crucial to look into the notions of critical functions and of public interest, 
which on the one hand define the distinction among resolution and liquidation and on 
the other, there was observed a dimension between the SRB and the Italian state in 
the Veneto banks cases about its existence. 
 
 
3. A critical view of the definitions of critical functions and public interest 
objective. Harmonization as the key answer. 
 
3.1 Dimension of views on state aid between the Italian government and the SRB. 
 
As it has been illustrated from the abovementioned cases a key component in the 
appraisal of public interest existence is, if certain functions of the banks that are 
considered to be FOLTF viewed as critical.  Besides the definition for critical functions 
under the BRRD, the Commission authorized regulation 2016/778, which complements 
the BRRD among others about the determine criteria of critical operations.232 Under 
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Art.6 of the regulation, criticality of a function based on, whether it is given by an 
institution to third parties not related to the company or group and, whether the 
unexpected disruption of it could, negatively affect the third parties, boost the 
contagion or, weaken the general confidence of market participants because of the 
function’s systemically relevance for the third parties and, the systemic relevance for 
the institution or group in offering the operation. As it has been said, the SRB opposed 
the view of the Italian banks that their functions of deposit-taking and lending 
activities and payment services were critical because there were given to a limited 
number of third parties, as well as due to their substitutability in a reasonable manner 
and timeframe.233 In particular, the SRB assessing at the liquidation’s impact on 
financial stability stated that “substitutability of the deposit and lending functions in 
the Veneto region is expected to be high due to the large number of credit institutions 
active in the region”. 234 It seems that the SRB rejects the possibility of a systemic 
impact of liquidation both at a national and local level. In contrast, the Italian State 
Degree argued that without state aid measures the liquidation “would lead to the 
destruction of value of the banks, with serious losses for non-professional 
creditors…and would entail a sudden interruption in the provision of credit to 
businesses and families with negative repercussions of economic and social character, 
as well as on employment”.235 It concluded that the adoption of state aid measures 
was needed in order to permit “the orderly exit of the banks from the market and 
avoiding a serious disturbance to the local economy”.236  
Hence, the application of the national support measures, which included a €3.5 billion 
aid of public funds to ISP,237 illustrated under the Ministry of Economy and Finance 
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(MEF) and by the Pier Carlo Padoan as, “the best way to rescue Veneto banks”.238 The 
alleged arguments were that, with liquidation certain injuries would have occurred for 
bank’s investors and the EU does not prevent the state support whether it is provided 
in line with specific rules; a condition that was satisfied since the European 
Commission approved the feasibility of state aid239 on 25 June 2017.240 Furthermore, 
he noted that with the national aid it was likely for the ISP to acquire a business 
complex that would rescue plenty of jobs, ensures credit continuity for companies and, 
artisans and prevent difficulties for households and savers.241 In other words, the 
Italian state did not rescue two banks but the economy of the whole region.242 
Virtually, it seems that the state aid is justified under the assessment of the 
government on regional effects of liquidation;   nonetheless, this appears to oppose 
the SRB’s decision about the substitutability of the bank’s functions.243  
 
 
3.2 The interaction between the state aid framework and the implementation of 
resolution actions under the BRRD.  
 
 
About the state aid framework,244 was preceded the BRRD, while the two regimes 
seems to operate alongside.245 In particular, the BRRD requires compliance with the EU 
state aid framework, where applicable, by the MSs when implementing resolution 
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actions.246 The criteria on whether the resolution actions compose state aid are the 
same as for every other action under the EU state aid frame.247 Moreover, state aid 
will at least trigger the write down or conversion capital tools under the BRRD and 
might also trigger resolution, with the exemption of precautionary recapitalization 
tool, where state aid does not activate the BRRD framework,248 and is permitted 
without resolution under restricted situations.249 
In regards of bank in liquidation the EU rules also permit state aid.250 The rationale 
behind it is that, while the liquidation of less important banks may not have an impact 
on the European financial scheme, their market exit still may have a serious impact in 
the areas where those banks are active.251 Thus, outside the European banking 
resolution frame, it is on the burden of MSs to choose, whether the exit of such banks 
can lead to serious effects on the regional economy and, if they wish to use public 
funds to diminish these effects.252 The EU state aid support rules predict this 
likelihood253and the European Commission (EC) can approve state aid under art.107 (3) 
(b) of the TFEU to cure an interruption in MSs economy.254 Specifically, the EC 
approached the state aid actions under six commission communications with the most 
current to be the 2013 EC banking communication.255 Although, it did not specify the 
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possible form of a serious impact on the local economy and this could lead to 
controversial outcomes.256  
According to the notion of critical functions and state aid, whilst the concept is clear in 
respect of the SRB’s review of the existence of public interest, it is however, not clear 
about what its purpose is in the EU discipline on the state aid; it may be effective, the 
SRB to supply a clear assessment of the potential impact of the liquidation at the 
regional level.257 In a combination with harmonization of the different national 
insolvency laws, a more clear assessment could occur regards the decision to provide 
state aid measures.258 Moreover, the harmonization of EU Insolvency law, 
supplementing the EU resolution framework, could enhance the accurate function of 
the Banking Union, as the creditors, taxpayers, and institutions could be more 
confident about the regulations that control liquidation and its effects.259  
Concerning that, the ABLV bank case260 provides two contradictory rulings, specifically, 
the liquidation of the ABLV bank in Latvia and, the resolution of its affiliate into 
Luxembourg261 illustrates, even more, the significance of harmonizing banks’ 
insolvency legislations. Inter alia, it has been proposed by Daniele Nouy, the 
amendment of Art.32 of BRRD, to include the statement of FOLTF as criterion for 
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liquidation under national legislation.262 As a result, in the absence of public interest 
that leads to resolution tools, banks must be liquidated under national insolvency law 
and not resolved.263 This goal has been achieved in 2019 with the new EU Directive of 
the European Parliament and the Council, amending the BRRD.264 In particular, under 
the new Art.32b, the MSs must ensure that in case of, whether no public interest is 
met then an institution must be wound up in an orderly way under the appropriate 
national law. 
 
 
3.3 The European Commission’s directive that differs from the normal insolvency 
proceedings.  
 
 
Accordingly, the need of harmonization of the national insolvency laws in the EU 
considered to be essential for a well-functioning Banking Union and to avoid, as much 
as possible, the different approaches of critical definitions; that leads to the decision of 
whether the bank’s need to be resolved under the BRRD or liquidated under normal 
insolvency proceedings. Moreover, a senior harmonization degree in insolvency is 
important for the proper function of a single market union and for a real Capital 
Markets Union, which are significant matters for the EU.265 An answer to that appears 
to be the European Commission’s suggestion on 22 November 2016 for a new directive 
about ‘preventive restructuring frameworks, second chance, and measures to increase 
the efficiency of restructuring, insolvency, and discharge procedures, as well as 
amending directive of 2012/30/EU’.266 The proposal’s goal was to minimize the 
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barriers to the free movement of capital arising from differences in MSs Restructuring 
and insolvency procedures.267 Although, it did not harmonized basic parts of insolvency 
but concentrated on dealing with the most significant problem that could be tackled 
with harmonization.268 The certain proposal has led to a new directive of 2019269 
directed to the MSs270 and ensures that feasible institutions and entrepreneurs, which 
are in financial distress, have the right of entry to effective national preventive 
restructuring frameworks that allows them to continue operating.271 Moreover, 
permits debtors in financial distress to continue business and to restructure efficiently 
at the very beginning and thus avoiding insolvency and preventive the liquidation of 
feasible institutions.272 Inter alia, these frameworks help to increase the total value to 
creditors compared to what they would have received in liquidation of the institution’s 
assets.273 The directive is wholly compatible with and complements the insolvency 
proceedings regulation that does not address the differences among national laws 
regulating insolvency procedures.274 
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Chapter IV: The bail-in tool under an insolvency law perspective. 
 
In case of whether the Bank’s financial health keeps to deteriorating even after the 
early intervention measures or whether it is fading so fast that the latter cannot 
handle the situation appropriately, then the NRAs have to decide if the resolution of 
the institution is the proper solution instead of its recovery.275 As it has been 
aforementioned in this thesis, the RAs have to choose among four resolution tools 
under the BRRD. 
 
1. A briefly explore to the transfer resolution tools under the BRRD. 
 
 
The sale of business tool276 guarantees that the RAs can transfer to a buyer, which is 
not a bridge bank, the shares of the resolved bank or any of its assets, rights, or 
liabilities. The transfer must be made on commercial terms277 as well as the sale shall 
be marketed even separately and in a transparent manner except if it entails a 
material risk to financial stability.278 The bridge bank tool279 is again a transfer 
instrument that is practical in occasions where no purchase is expected due to the 
huge bank’s balance sheet and/or when the whole financial area experiences a 
systemic crisis.280 Furthermore, the NCWO rule applies, and it successfully recapitalizes 
the bank’s viable parts and, it might have an equal economic impact with the 
application of bail-in.281 Aftermath the termination of its operations under certain 
events provided in Art.41&3 BRRD, the bank must be liquidated under normal 
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insolvency procedures.282 The asset separation instrument283 constitutes the last 
transfer tool, which may be applied only in combination with one of the other 
resolution tools.284 This is because its goal is to remove ‘toxic’ assets from the bank’s 
balance sheet and insulate them into a separate entity, as a result, this could, inter 
alia, enhance the moral hazard problem.285 The RAs can apply this certain tool only in 
specific circumstances, for instance, where the liquidated assets under standard 
insolvency procedures may harm the financial markets.286  
In the case of a partial transfer of the assets, rights or liabilities under the sale of 
business tool or the bridge bank instrument the remaining entity must be wound up 
under normal insolvency proceedings287 that include both the corporate insolvency law 
and the bank insolvency legislation. With the latter, the remaining entity has the 
power to give to the receiver all the essential services to guarantee the continuation of 
critical functions.288 
 
2. The bail-in tool under insolvency and regulatory perspective. 
 
It has been observed that there were no big surprises in the Commission’s proposal of 
the resolution tools and, that mechanism should exist to go beyond just simple 
monitoring of divergence in the appliance and understanding of the resolution 
conditions.289 Nonetheless, the bail-in tool has been described in legal literature inter 
alia, as the most important regulatory achievement in the aftermath of crisis attempts 
                                               
282 Art.41&8 BRRD 
283 Ibid Art. 42  
284 Ibid Art. 37&5 
285 Michael Schillig, ‘Resolution and Insolvency of Banks and Financial Institutions’, [2016] 
Oxford, p.255,256 (para.10.12 and 10.13)  
286 Ibid Art. 42&5 
287 Ibid Art.37&6 
288 Michael SChillig, ‘Resolution and Insolvency of Banks and Financial Institutions’, [2016] 
Oxford, p.251 (para.10.03) 
289 Slaughter and May, ‘An introduction to the European Commission’s proposals on Recovery 
and Resolutions of banks and investment firms. Crisis Management moves up a gear in the 
European Union’, [2012], available at <http://www.slaughterandmay.com/media/1825304/an-
intro-to-the-european-commissions-proposal-on-recovery-and-resolution-of-banks-and-
investment-firms.pdf> accessed 2 Dec 2019 p.35 
   
 -48- 
to end the TBTF problem and, as the most disputable weapon between the guns.290 
With the bail-in tool, the NRAs may write-down the unsecured debt of a bank and turn 
it into equity.291 In particular, they will apply the certain tool either for the 
recapitalization of the bank with the writing down of suitable liabilities so as to 
reinstate its skill to comply with the conditions for its authorization292 or to convert to 
equity or to diminish the main amount of the transferred debt to a bridge bank or a 
private sector purchaser or an asset management vehicle.293 For its triggering, the 
resolution conditions must be fulfilled and the resolution powers under art.63&1 BRRD 
must be met by the RAs. The implement of the bail-in tool for the recapitalization of a 
bank is more complex than for the conversion of debt into equity.294 The bail-in tool 
has some characteristics that seemed to be the same with the write-down or 
conversion of capital instruments tool pursuant to arts. 59 and 60 under the BRRD and 
art.21 of the SRMR that is applied either separately from resolution or combined with 
the implementation of resolution tools.295  
 
This thesis mainly explored the bail-in mechanism from an insolvency law comparison. 
A statutory bail-in tool under an insolvency law viewpoint makes a unique type of debt 
restructuring system for banks, in particular, this debt to equity exchange has as a goal 
the recapitalization of the bank or of a new body that obtain assets or liabilities of the 
bank.296 It appears that the bail-in tool is alike with a concept that is known to 
insolvency lawyers as a ‘chameleon equity firm’, under which the institution supplies 
debt in many tranches and in a financial difficulty the highest priority claims are 
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converted into equity while the lowest are wiped out.297 Moreover, the bail-in tool 
constitutes a pre-packaged process as the debt restructuring based on the resolution 
plans taken in advance by the SRB after its valuation of the institution’s assets and 
liabilities and its resolvability appraisal.298 The difference between the insolvency 
legislation and bank resolution lies in the decision that triggers the reorganization of 
banks. The former’s decision of bank’s restructuring or liquidation based on, which 
way the most profits are produced for the creditors; while under resolution, bail-in 
mechanism applied only on whether public interest exists even without the consent of 
creditors.299 This bank resolution peculiarity may be justified as the insolvency theory 
of anti-commons actions.300  
 
Moreover, the resolution principles301 disclose a connection between the bail-in tool 
and insolvency law, as most of them are virtually established principles of the latter.302 
Inter alia, the resolution principles established the hierarchy of claims under the BRRD, 
which are in alignment with the customary distributional regulations applied in an 
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insolvency process303 under which it appears that in the majority of EU MSs the 
shareholders are initially liable to bail-in, secondly junior creditors and lastly unsecured 
creditors.304 This method illustrates the aforementioned, NCWO principle on which 
creditors must not be affected worst under bail-n than in liquidation.305 Nonetheless, 
in EU bank resolution framework, public interests set as priority over the individual 
rights of creditors, thus all banks’ liabilities may be liable to write down and conversion 
mechanisms under the bail-in tool with an exemption of certain liabilities that maintain 
their place into liquidation while into bail-in viewed as de facto senior to a group of 
‘bail-inable’ liabilities.306 Consequently, the differences among the handling of the 
bank’s liabilities in bail-in and liquidation can increase more whether NRAs choose to 
exclude specific liabilities from bail-in.307 As it has been abovementioned the covered 
deposits is the most important objective of resolution principles and it shall be 
excluded by the bail-in tool308, however, in a bank’s asset liquidation in virtue of an 
MSs insolvency legislation it is likely to rank similarly with usual unsecured, non-
preferred claims.309 This may boost the odds of creditors to be allowed to 
compensation under the NCWO principle as the group of liabilities available to bail-in 
has been reduced.310 This could be one more argument for the requisite to be 
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harmonized national insolvency law.311 In that point, it is worth mentioned, besides 
that the Art.108 of the BRRD providing additional alignment of depositors and deposit 
guarantee systems position in resolution, with their position in liquidation, still the 
significant differences among the ranking of claims in the context of the bail-in tool 
and those that recognized under national insolvency law lead to many difficulties.312 
For instance, the different handling of creditors and claims into liquidation by national 
laws can result to differences about the appliance of the bail-in tool, hence, the RAs 
have the burden to choose in every resolution process which national insolvency 
legislation is applicable in order to decide the hierarchy of claims, something that in 
case of great global banks may be significantly intricate and hard for creditors to 
appraise if their claims may be bailed-in.313  
 
At this point, this thesis assessed the bail-in tool under a regulatory perspective 
through the Cyprus bail-in case, where for the first time in the interlinked sovereign 
and bank debt disaster the bank senior creditors experienced haircut.314 A conclusion 
that has been illustrated afterward was that within the years of the Eurozone financial 
crisis several rules and political decisions had been taken on an ad hoc, opportunistic 
and confused manner absent fully consideration and appropriate reflection.315 Such an 
ad hoc-unsystematic approach provides inter alia, too broadly proposals that supply no 
real regulatory guidance.316 The BRRD resolution tools constitute such excessively wide 
regulatory measures as it did not supply any guidance about which tools must be used 
in which cases or as to how they must be calibrated.317 It has been noted that this 
broad basis may maximize instead of minimize moral hazard problem; hence the bail-
in tool may have a contagion impact and carries market and regulatory risks which 
reveal the fact that its creation and implementation has not been  design 
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systematically.318 Particularly, it constitutes an ad hoc regulatory instrument, which 
seeks more on preventive the expose of taxpayers to bank bailouts instead of creating 
sound legal and market circumstances to evade a potential crisis, which is something 
that it could be reached with less discretion on RAs hands concerning, which groups 
enforce losses on.319 
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Conclusions 
 
The present analysis attempted to shed some light on the current EU resolution 
framework for dealing with banks that are failing or are likely to fail and, its 
relationship with the normal insolvency procedures that are followed by the MSs in 
cases where a bank faces financial difficulties. In particular, the comparison of the 
resolution procedure under the BRRD and the liquidation under the normal insolvency 
proceedings illustrates how far the EU managed to go since the worldwide financial 
crisis of 2007-2008. Moreover, it demonstrates what has changed since then, about 
the methods on which institutions can be saved from collapsing, as till then the normal 
insolvency proved to be ineffective in the sense that sometimes has shown to be 
unsuitable to handle efficiently the failure of banks. Because of certain rules for bank 
resolution, proved to be needed to disclose taxpayers from the burden to bail-out 
financial institutions and, properly resolved without the use of public funds. Thus, 
resolution and liquidation differ significantly regarding the relevant legislation of the 
use of public resources. The former are within the scope of both BRRD and State aid 
and, thus entail a preliminary bail-in up to 8% of total liabilities, whereas the latter are 
only subject to State aid burden-sharing conditions. Moreover, one of their biggest 
disparities constitute the ranking of claims in the context of the bail-in tool as one of 
the BRRD objective is to protect covered depositors and must be exempted from the 
bail-in tool, while under national insolvency proceedings and liquidation they may be 
ranking equal by claims of often unsecured, non-preferred creditors. This may increase 
the likelihood for creditors to ask for compensation under the NCWO rule. The latter 
constitutes the key principle of the BRRD for the protection of creditors and the 
national insolvency law plays a comparison role for its assessment. 
 
Furthermore, throughout the evaluation of the resolution of the Spain’s Banco Popular 
case and, the liquidation of the Italian’s Veneto Banca and Banca Popolare di Vicenza 
cases several issues were demonstrated that helps to provide a critic for the new EU 
resolution regime. The resolution mechanism for the banks is far from being 
unproblematic as, the recent cases have demonstrated that banks are simply too 
different to obey on a single guide. For sure the BRRD constitutes a controversial topic, 
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as there have been conflicting views about it. Carmen Bell, practice lead at advisory 
firm Global Counsel in Brussels, argues that the Italian and Spanish cases illustrate “a 
half-built system”,320 while Lorenzo Codogno, a professor at European Institute of the 
London School of Economics and Political Science, noted that the issue was that 
“Europe decided not to allow for a transition period, which was a political mistake”.321 
Opponents have stressed that the BRRD is enough flexible to handle different banks, 
while with the resolution of the Banco Popular the test for the sufficiency of the new 
resolution framework has passed.322 As for the Veneto Banks case, Amelie Champsaur, 
associate at law firm in Paris dispute that “the emergency decree of June 25 is not a 
normal insolvency regime. It is an ad hoc resolution regime. It was called liquidation, 
but the two banks were actually placed in resolution.”323 
 
In respect of the Italian banks’ cases, a big question that arises is that if Italy does not 
have to conform by EU resolution rules what consequences this may have to the 
Banking Union scheme. The EU’s permission to the liquidation of the Veneto banks 
appears to be an infringement to the BRRD and has the risk for the regulation to lose 
its value and credibility. Giovanni Sabatini, the general director of the Italian Bank 
Association argued that the reason behind the different approach between MSs is the 
“desperate desire of national governments to avoid imposing new bail-in rules on 
investors in their troubled lenders”.324 Virtually, that was Italy’s problem with the 
BRRD rules as the state’s banks frequently sell capital bonds to investors, who were 
looking for a higher-yielding on their money with low awareness of EU bank rules,325 
and the bail-in tool, inter alia, would cost an important injure to bank’s reputation over 
the country.326 Nevertheless, the BRRD offers a sort of flexibility under Art.32&4(d), 
which provides a precautionary recapitalization as an alternative to bail-in tool and 
outside the scope of the BRRD, where public funds can be added in banks without 
                                               
320 Louise Bowman, ‘Banking: Throwing the Bail-in out with the bath water’, [2017], p.1, 
available at LexisNexis.com, accessed 13 Dec 2019 
321 Ibid p.2 
322 Ibid 
323 Ibid p.4 
324 Ibid p.1  
325 Rupert Hargreaves, ‘Italy Bailout: Buy Bank Debt Regardless Of Credit Quality?’, [2017], p.1, 
available at LexisNexis.com, accessed 13 Dec 2019 
326 Ibid 
   
 -55- 
triggering resolution and the 8% bail-in requirement, after following a certain stress 
test.327 In the aftermath of the Veneto Banks bailout, it is crystal clear that the 
peculiarities of each country need to overcome in order to mark a single approach that 
should and could be followed by the Member States. To make a trend to happen, the 
case of the Veneto banks needs to mark an end to any endeavor of avoiding the 
burden of losses on investors in failed banks.  
 
Moreover, a single EU Insolvency law, that complements the EU resolution regulations 
is needed to enhance the union’s banking system and makes the whole picture for the 
creditors, taxpayers, and banks more stable and not so unpredictable. Together it 
would mark a united, interrelated framework that prevents the banks from failing and, 
protect financial stability. The new EU Directive 2019/1023 on preventive restructuring 
procedures and, supplementing the insolvency proceedings is a promising step into the 
right direction.  
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